Red Sea Cable Cuts 2024

Situation Overview

In late February 2024, three submarine cable systems in the Red Sea were physically damaged at points consistent with seabed disturbance near a vessel sinking. The damage coincided with the continuing Houthi (Ansar Allah) maritime campaign against commercial shipping in the Red Sea in support of Gaza. The mechanism of damage — anchor drag from a sinking vessel — is established by BGP routing change analysis and seabed survey evidence. The attribution of deliberate intent to Houthi forces for the cable damage specifically (as opposed to the vessel sinking) is disputed and not confirmed in open source.

Damaged Cable Systems

Three cable systems were affected; a fourth system (SMW5 / Sea-Me-We 5) was initially reported damaged but this was not confirmed:

1. SEACOM / TGN-EA (East Africa): SEACOM is a cable owned by SEACOM Limited (pan-African ownership); TGN-EA (Tata Global Network — East Africa) co-routes along the same physical path in this segment. Counted as one system because the physical cable damage affected both. The SEACOM-TGN-EA system carries substantial East Africa–Europe traffic.

2. EIG (Europe India Gateway): A consortium cable connecting the UK and India via the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean. Owned by consortium including BT, Deutsche Telekom, Telecom Italia Sparkle, and others. Major traffic artery for South Asian data to Europe.

3. AAE-1 (Asia Africa Europe 1): One of the highest-capacity cables in the Red Sea/Indian Ocean corridor (designed capacity ~40 Tbps), connecting Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, and Europe. Owned by a consortium including China Unicom, Etisalat, Orange, and others.

Damage Mechanism

The Rubymar: On February 18, 2024, the Belize-flagged bulk carrier MV Rubymar was struck by Houthi missiles and severely damaged in the Red Sea. The vessel’s crew abandoned ship. Rubymar drifted for approximately 12 days while taking on water, dragging its anchor as it drifted. Rubymar sank on March 2, 2024. BGP route withdrawal timestamps for the three cable systems — verified by network monitoring services (TeleGeography, Kentik, RIPE RIS data) — are consistent with the timeframe and trajectory of Rubymar’s anchor drag as the vessel listed and drifted before sinking.

What the Houthis did NOT do: Houthi forces publicly claimed they did not cut the cables and denied targeting internet infrastructure. Senior Houthi officials stated in media appearances that cutting submarine cables was contrary to their stated war aims. These denials are politically motivated but the physical evidence does not contradict them: the damage mechanism is anchor drag from a sinking vessel, not deliberate cable-cutting. (Assessment, Medium confidence — mechanism is established; Houthi denial of deliberate intent is consistent with evidence but cannot exclude prior planning that included vessel-drag as a foreseeable consequence)

BGP evidence: Network operators reported latency increases and traffic rerouting consistent with three distinct cable failures in the southern Red Sea within a 24-hour window. Route changes captured in RIPE RIS and RouteViews data allow reconstruction of the approximate failure sequence and geographic location.

Strategic Impact

• Approximately 25% of Asia–Europe internet traffic transited these cable systems at time of damage (TeleGeography estimate).
• Traffic was rerouted via terrestrial alternatives (Middle East overland fiber), Cape of Good Hope routing (adding ~150-200 ms latency), and existing capacity on parallel Red Sea cables (SMW3, SMW5, IMEWE, Falcon).
• Repair was complicated by the ongoing Houthi maritime campaign: cable repair vessels require safe passage guarantees that were not credibly available during the height of the Houthi anti-shipping campaign (January–May 2024). Cable repair ships are slow, unarmed surface vessels vulnerable to the same anti-ship cruise and ballistic missile threats that caused Rubymar’s sinking.
• The SEACOM outage materially degraded East African internet connectivity; countries including Kenya, Tanzania, and Ethiopia reported increased latency and packet loss.

Attribution Assessment

• Houthi direct cable-cutting: Contradicted — physical evidence (anchor drag from drifting vessel) does not support direct cutting by divers or submersibles; Houthi denial is credible in mechanism terms
• Houthi indirect causation: Assessment (Medium confidence) — the Rubymar was sunk by Houthi missile strike; the consequent anchor drag caused the cable damage; Houthi forces thus bear indirect causal responsibility for the cable damage through the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their maritime campaign
• Deliberate strategic planning to damage cables via Rubymar drag: Gap — not established whether Houthi planners anticipated cable damage from the sinking as a desired effect

Geopolitical Context

The Red Sea cable incidents occurred during a period of maximum Houthi maritime pressure (>50 commercial vessel attacks between November 2023 and mid-2024). The incidents illustrated the collateral vulnerability of seabed infrastructure to maritime warfare in congested chokepoint waters — a vulnerability that does not require deliberate cable-targeting intent to materialize.

The Bab-el-Mandeb strait — through which Rubymar was transiting — is the pinch point through which approximately 17% of global maritime trade and all Red Sea submarine cables must pass. Its dual significance as a commercial shipping lane and cable corridor means that any maritime conflict in this chokepoint carries inherent cable infrastructure risk.

Repair Status

As of May 2026, repair operations had been conducted under US Navy and coalition escort. SEACOM-TGN-EA and EIG repairs were completed by mid-2024. AAE-1 repair was also completed. The ongoing elevated maritime threat in the Red Sea led cable operators to negotiate escort protocols with the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) operating under Operation Prosperity Guardian.

Open Gaps

1. Whether any Houthi military planning documents reference cable infrastructure damage as a desired effect (not in open source)
2. Exact seabed cable failure locations relative to Rubymar’s tracked drift trajectory (requires survey data not publicly released)
3. Whether Rubymar’s sinking was deliberately chosen as a target because of cable route proximity (not established)

Sources

Source	Confidence
TeleGeography — Red Sea cable damage analysis (February 2024)	High
Kentik BGP route analysis — Red Sea cable failures (2024)	High
RIPE RIS routing data — timestamp reconstruction	High
SEACOM press release — cable outage (February 2024)	High
Lloyd’s List — Rubymar sinking timeline	High
Houthi media (al-Masirah) — cable denial statement	Medium (primary, state-aligned)
US CENTCOM — Rubymar attack confirmation	High