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Verification Cost Asymmetry in Cognitive Warfare: A Complexity-Theoretic Framework

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Verification Cost Asymmetry in Cognitive Warfare: A Complexity-Theoretic Framework

Authors: Joshua Luberisse
Published: 2025-07-28
arXiv: 2507.21258
Source: arXiv (cs.CR / cs.CC / cs.CY / cs.GT)

Abstract

Human verification under adversarial information flow operates as a cost-bounded decision procedure constrained by working memory limits and cognitive biases. We introduce the Verification Cost Asymmetry (VCA) coefficient, formalizing it as the ratio of expected verification work between populations under identical claim distributions. Drawing on probabilistically checkable proofs (PCP) and parameterized complexity theory, we construct dissemination protocols that reduce verification for trusted audiences to constant human effort while imposing superlinear costs on adversarial populations lacking cryptographic infrastructure. We prove theoretical guarantees for this asymmetry, validate the framework through controlled user studies, and demonstrate practical encoding of real-world information campaigns. The results establish complexity-theoretic foundations for engineering democratic advantage in cognitive warfare, with immediate applications to content authentication, platform governance, and information operations doctrine.

Why This Work Matters

The VCA framework inverts the standard Cognitive Warfare problem statement. Rather than asking “how do we prevent adversaries from spreading disinformation?” (reactive), it asks “how do we make truth easier to verify for authorized audiences while making false information expensive to construct credibly?” This is the correct engineering frame for Cognitive Resilience at scale.

The complexity-theoretic approach moves cognitive warfare countermeasures out of persuasion (attitude change) into systems engineering (friction costs). Provenance infrastructure — cryptographic attestation of content origin — imposes superlinear verification costs on adversaries trying to manufacture credible false content, while trusted audiences with access to the same infrastructure verify with constant effort.

For OSINT methodology: the spot-checkable provenance concept is operationally relevant. If content provenance is cryptographically attested at source, OSINT analysts can verify authenticity without the full multi-source triangulation currently required.

Core Concepts and Contributions

VCA coefficient: Ratio of verification work required by adversarial population (lacking cryptographic infrastructure) to verification work required by trusted population (with provenance access). Properly constructed dissemination protocols make this ratio superlinear — adversarial verification costs scale polynomially or worse while trusted verification remains O(1).

PCP/complexity grounding: The formal apparatus draws on probabilistically checkable proofs (any correct proof can be verified by spot-checking a small fraction of it). The asymmetry is mathematically guaranteed under the cryptographic assumptions, not empirically estimated.

Controlled user studies: Participants with access to spot-checkable provenance achieve equivalent verification accuracy with measurably less cognitive effort than participants without it. This bridges complexity theory to human factors in information warfare.

Policy implications: Content authentication standards (cryptographic signing at source, e.g., C2PA); platform governance (provenance-aware moderation); IO doctrine (designing campaigns around verifiable provenance to impose asymmetric friction on adversary replication).

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