Military Review, Vol. 96, No. 3 (May–June 2016)

This paper is one of the most precise and influential academic analyses of Russian military doctrine in the hybrid era. Bartles provides a detailed examination of General Valery Gerasimov’s 2013 article “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,” correcting widespread Western misinterpretations of what became known as the “Gerasimov Doctrine.”


Why This Work Is Foundational

The paper clarifies that Gerasimov’s concept is not a radical new doctrine of “hybrid war” invented by Russia, but rather a pragmatic synthesis of traditional Soviet operational art with modern non-military instruments. Bartles demonstrates that Russian thinking emphasizes the integration of non-military means (political, economic, informational, and psychological) as the primary method of achieving strategic objectives, with military force used only as a supporting or final element.


Core Concepts and Contributions

1. Correcting the “Gerasimov Doctrine” Misconception

Bartles shows that Western interpretations often reversed Gerasimov’s actual argument: the general was describing how the West (particularly the United States) already employs non-military instruments, and Russia must adapt to this reality rather than invent a new form of warfare.

2. The Primacy of Non-Military Means

The paper highlights the Russian view that modern conflict begins with non-military instruments (information, political, economic) and that the military component is introduced only when necessary to consolidate gains.

3. The “New Generation Warfare” Framework

Bartles outlines the Russian emphasis on:

  • Asymmetry
  • Integration of all instruments of national power
  • The information domain as a primary battlespace
  • The importance of reflexive control and perception management

4. Operational Art in the Information Age

The author connects Gerasimov’s ideas to classical Soviet operational art, showing continuity rather than rupture in Russian military thought.


Analytical Value for This Knowledge Base

This paper is essential for accurate assessment of Russian (and by extension other revisionist states’) strategic behavior. It serves as the primary reference for:


Key Connections


Analysts should treat this paper as the standard reference when examining Russian strategic or hybrid operations. It corrects common Western misconceptions and provides a more accurate lens for interpreting Russian actions and statements. The original 2016 Military Review article is publicly available and should be the primary citation.

Last updated: April 2026