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Kurdistan — The PKK Conflict and Kurdish Political Futures: Strategic Assessment

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Bottom Line Up Front

The forty-year armed conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) entered an unprecedented terminal phase in 2025–2026. The PKK formally dissolved at its 12th Congress in May 2025, conducted a symbolic weapons-burning ceremony in Iraqi Kurdistan in July 2025, withdrew its remaining cadres from Turkish territory by 26 October 2025, and vacated its historical Zap stronghold by mid-November. A Turkish parliamentary peace commission adopted its framework report on 18 February 2026, formally opening what the DEM Party calls the “second phase” of the process.

Assessment (high confidence): The kinetic phase of the PKK insurgency is effectively over. Assessment (moderate confidence): The political settlement that should follow is stalling, with Ankara conditioning all reform on full disarmament verification while the Kurdish political bloc demands constitutional recognition and a release-or-status framework for Abdullah Öcalan. Assessment (moderate confidence): The 2026 US–Israel–Iran war has reoriented Ankara’s calculus from political reform toward regional risk-management, raising the probability that the peace process freezes at a “post-insurgency, pre-settlement” plateau into 2027. The Syria track has already collapsed in Ankara’s favour: the SDF–Damascus integration deal of January 2026 dissolved the autonomous Kurdish administration in northeast Syria as a strategic actor, achieving by Syrian proxy what Turkish cross-border operations could not.

Strategic Background

Fact: The PKK was founded in 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan and a Marxist-Leninist nucleus and launched its armed insurgency against the Turkish state on 15 August 1984. Cumulative fatalities since 1984 exceed 40,000.

Fact: Turkey, the United States, the EU, and the United Kingdom designate the PKK as a terrorist organization. Russia and China do not.

Fact: Three previous peace efforts collapsed:

  • The 1999 capture of Öcalan in Kenya and his subsequent imprisonment on İmralı Island, which produced a unilateral PKK ceasefire that frayed by the mid-2000s.
  • The Oslo back-channel talks (2009–2011), abandoned after leaks.
  • The İmralı / “Solution Process” (2013–2015), which collapsed into the 2015–2017 urban-warfare phase in southeastern Turkey, the destruction of historic centres of Sur, Cizre, and Nusaybin, and Turkey’s first major cross-border operations into Syria (Operation Euphrates Shield, Operation Olive Branch).

Assessment (high confidence): The current opening differs structurally from the 2013–2015 attempt because three external pressures converged simultaneously — the post-Assad collapse of the Syrian strategic depth on which the PKK’s affiliated YPG/SDF relied, the durable territorial degradation of PKK base infrastructure in the Qandil and Zap regions of Iraq following Turkey’s Operation Claw campaigns (2019–2024), and Erdoğan’s domestic need for DEM Party parliamentary support for a constitutional package permitting his continued candidacy after 2028.

The 2025 Peace Opening

Fact: On 22 October 2024, Devlet Bahçeli, leader of Turkey’s far-right MHP and Erdoğan’s coalition partner, publicly suggested Öcalan could address parliament if he renounced violence. The signal was unprecedented coming from MHP, historically the most hawkish bloc on the Kurdish question.

Fact: On 27 February 2025, a DEM Party delegation delivered Öcalan’s “Call for Peace and Democratic Society” from İmralı, in which he instructed the PKK to convene a congress, dissolve, and lay down arms. The PKK announced a unilateral ceasefire on 1 March 2025.

Assessment (high confidence): Three convergent calculations enabled the opening:

  1. AKP–MHP political calculus. Erdoğan requires either a constitutional amendment or a snap-election framework to remain a candidate beyond 2028. Both pathways require votes the AKP–MHP bloc does not control on its own; the DEM Party’s ~60 seats are the swing bloc. Removing the PKK from the political equation removes the principal MHP-side veto on engaging DEM as a parliamentary partner.

  2. PKK strategic depletion. Turkish drone-and-ISR campaigns from 2019 onward, combined with the loss of Syrian rear-area sanctuary after Assad’s December 2024 fall, reduced PKK operational tempo to historic lows by mid-2024. Gap (moderate confidence): Open-source attribution of internal PKK leadership debate remains thin; the precise balance between Öcalan’s authority and Cemil Bayık / Murat Karayılan field-command preferences in the dissolution decision is not publicly verifiable.

  3. DEM Party institutional incentive. After the kayyum (trustee) replacement of elected DEM mayors through 2024, the party calculated that a peace track was the only available path back to municipal governance and away from prosecutorial dissolution.

PKK Disarmament Process

Fact: Sequence of implemented steps, February 2025 – November 2025:

DateEvent
27 Feb 2025Öcalan’s “Call for Peace and Democratic Society” delivered from İmralı
1 Mar 2025PKK declares unilateral ceasefire
12 May 2025PKK 12th Congress votes formal dissolution and end of armed struggle
11 Jul 2025Symbolic weapons-burning ceremony, Sulaymaniyah governorate, Iraqi Kurdistan
26 Oct 2025Last PKK units announce withdrawal from Turkish national territory
~15 Nov 2025Zap region (Hakurk / Avashin / Basyan complex) reported vacated
18 Feb 2026Turkish Grand National Assembly peace commission adopts framework report

Fact: The Turkish parliamentary commission report frames three pillars — “Terror-Free Turkey”, democratic strengthening, and economic development — but does not include explicit measures on Öcalan’s status, on the constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity, or on the release of long-detained Kurdish politicians (notably former HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş, jailed since 2016 in defiance of two European Court of Human Rights rulings).

Assessment (high confidence): Disarmament implementation has materially exceeded what any prior peace track achieved. Assessment (moderate confidence): The reciprocal Turkish step has not. Bahçeli’s May 2026 call for “official status” for Öcalan is a trial-balloon signal of MHP positioning, not a formalised state policy. DEM co-chair Tülay Hatimoğulları’s 21 March 2026 demands — partnership in governance, genuine negotiation, and constitutional recognition — define the gap between the PKK’s actual disarmament and the political settlement Ankara has so far refused to deliver.

Gap (moderate confidence): Verification architecture is opaque. The commission framework references disarmament verification but does not specify the inspection regime, the third-party guarantor (the KRG is the implicit but unconfirmed candidate), or the timeline for fighter reintegration. Without external guarantors — Chatham House and others have flagged this gap consistently — disarmament risks the same fate as 1999 and 2013.

The Syria Dimension

Fact: The Assad regime collapsed on 8 December 2024. The HTS-led transitional government under Ahmad al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) consolidated control of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama, but inherited a contested east controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) under Mazloum Abdi.

Fact: A first SDF–Damascus integration agreement was signed 10 March 2025 but stalled through 2025. A revised agreement was announced on 30 January 2026 following a Syrian government offensive into the northeast. Reported terms:

  • Phased integration of SDF military structures into the new Syrian Army.
  • Damascus government forces enter al-Hasakah and Qamishli.
  • SDF retains four military brigades operating in Kurdish-majority areas.
  • Up to ~80 percent of the former AANES territory ceded to central government control.
  • Presidential Decree 13 establishes Kurdish as a national language with provision for Kurdish-medium education and restoration of citizenship to Kurds stripped under Assad-era policies.

Assessment (high confidence): The deal represents the strategic dissolution of the AANES (Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria) as an autonomous political entity. Cultural recognition was traded for political and military autonomy. Assessment (high confidence): Ankara is the principal external winner; the deal achieves through Syrian state proxy what Operation Euphrates Shield (2016), Olive Branch (2018), Peace Spring (2019), and ongoing UAV strikes did not — the elimination of a coherent Kurdish political-military entity on Turkey’s southern border.

Assessment (moderate confidence): The Syrian deal de-couples the Turkish PKK track from the Syrian YPG/SDF track in Ankara’s threat perception, removing a major obstacle to the Turkish domestic settlement. Gap: It is not yet established that the SDF leadership has formally severed organizational and ideological linkage to the Öcalanist movement; the integration may produce, rather than dissolve, internal tensions over PKK-aligned cadres.

Fact: SDF–Syrian transitional government clashes recurred through early 2026, particularly around Deir ez-Zor and the Tishrin Dam corridor. The integration agreement’s enforcement remains incomplete.

The Iraq Dimension

Fact: Turkey maintains an estimated 40+ forward operating bases inside Iraqi sovereign territory, primarily in Duhok and Erbil governorates, established under successive phases of Operation Claw (Pençe) since 2019. Under the May 2024 KRG–Turkey security cooperation memorandum, the Iraqi federal government formally designated the PKK a banned organization.

Fact: Tracking of Turkey-PKK fatalities in northern Iraq was paused by major conflict trackers (ACLED, Crisis Group) on 20 January 2026, citing the de-escalation following PKK withdrawal.

Assessment (high confidence): The KRG (specifically the KDP-controlled Erbil government under the Barzani family) is the principal regional beneficiary. Decades of KDP–PKK rivalry — including direct armed clashes during the 1990s Kurdish civil war — gave Erbil a structural interest in PKK eviction from Qandil and the contested Sinjar region.

Assessment (moderate confidence): Sinjar remains the most volatile residual node. The ISIS genocide of Yezidis in 2014, the subsequent emergence of YBŞ (Sinjar Resistance Units, PKK-aligned) as the principal local defender, and ongoing Turkish UAV strikes on YBŞ figures into 2025 created a fault line that the formal PKK dissolution does not directly address. Gap: The status of YBŞ cadres and their formal organizational relationship to the dissolved PKK is not publicly clarified.

Assessment (moderate confidence): Turkish airstrikes on residual targets in northern Iraq have largely ceased since the October 2025 PKK withdrawal but the FOB infrastructure remains in place. Turkey will not dismantle its forward presence absent a stable verification regime, which constitutes leverage but also a permanent irritant in Turkey–Iraq federal relations.

Escalation Scenarios

Scenario 1 — Successful Transition (probability: ~25%)

Ankara delivers a constitutional package recognizing Kurdish identity rights, releases Demirtaş and other long-held politicians, and grants Öcalan a defined legal status (release to house arrest or formal interlocutor role). DEM Party becomes a legitimate parliamentary partner; Erdoğan secures the votes for his post-2028 candidacy. PKK reintegration proceeds under KRG-mediated verification. Sinjar and YBŞ are absorbed into a Baghdad–Erbil-managed framework. Indicators to watch: Demirtaş release, Öcalan İmralı transfer, constitutional package introduction.

Scenario 2 — Stalled Process / Frozen Conflict (probability: ~50% — modal)

Disarmament holds, but Ankara refuses substantive political reform. Process freezes at the post-insurgency / pre-settlement plateau. DEM is granted limited municipal restoration but constitutional recognition is denied. Öcalan remains in İmralı. PKK successor structures remain dormant but intact in Iraq. The Iran war’s regional pressure consumes Ankara’s strategic bandwidth. Indicators: Continued kayyum appointments to DEM municipalities, no Demirtaş release through 2026, MHP–DEM polarization on constitutional debate.

Scenario 3 — Renewed Armed Conflict (probability: ~25%)

A trigger event — assassination of a senior Kurdish figure, mass-casualty attack inside Turkey attributable or attributed to PKK splinters, Israeli or US sponsorship of PKK/PJAK as Iran-pressure proxies — produces a partial remobilization. PKK successor cells or splinter formations resume operations from northern Iraq. Ankara resumes Operation Claw posture and re-escalates against SDF residuals in northeast Syria. Indicators: Reports of Israeli or third-party contact with PKK/PJAK cadres, intra-PKK dissent over the Öcalan line, attack patterns inside Turkey resembling pre-2024 signatures.

Assessment (moderate confidence): Scenario 2 is the modal outcome. The disarmament is real and largely irreversible at the organizational level, but the political deliverables Ankara would need to make the settlement durable conflict directly with the AKP–MHP coalition’s identity politics. A frozen process is the equilibrium that satisfies short-term incentives on both sides without resolving the underlying constitutional question.

Strategic Implications

  1. Turkish strategic gain (high confidence). Ankara has achieved its principal post-1984 security objective — the disarmament of the PKK and the dissolution of the AANES — at a cost of symbolic concessions but no constitutional surrender. This is the largest unforced strategic gain by the Turkish state in the hybrid-conflict domain in two decades.

  2. Kurdish political consolidation (moderate confidence). Across the four-country Kurdish space, the political centre of gravity shifts from armed movements (PKK, YPG) to electoral and institutional actors (DEM in Turkey, KDP/PUK in Iraq, the integrated SDF civilian leadership in Syria). The Iranian Kurdish parties (PJAK, KDPI, Komala) face an ambiguous moment — the Iran war creates operational opportunity but removes the PKK rear-area infrastructure they depended on.

  3. US strategic exposure. United States equities in the SDF/anti-ISIS mission are being unwound on terms set by Ankara and Damascus. The residual ~900 US troops in northeast Syria are increasingly a hedge without a mission rather than a force in being. Gap: US policy on a residual Kurdish security partner post-integration is unstated.

  4. Israeli–Kurdish dimension. Reports — including direct allegations from Turkish-aligned outlets — of Israeli attempts to deploy PKK/PJAK formations against Iran constitute an explicit hybrid-warfare vector. Assessment (low-to-moderate confidence): Such operationalization, even if attempted at limited scale, would be the single most likely trigger for Scenario 3 escalation by giving Ankara grounds to declare the peace process abrogated.

  5. Hybrid-warfare lesson. The Kurdistan case demonstrates that a forty-year insurgency can be terminated through the convergence of regional shock (Assad’s fall), kinetic depletion (drone-ISR attrition), and political contingency (MHP–AKP coalition needs) — but that termination of armed conflict and resolution of the underlying political grievance are distinct events. Ankara has secured the first; the second remains contingent on choices yet to be made in 2026–2027.

Sources

  • International Crisis Group. Türkiye’s PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer.
  • International Center for Transitional Justice. The PKK Kurdish Militant Group Will Disarm and Disband as Part of a Peace Initiative with Turkey.
  • Chatham House. PKK leader Öcalan’s historic call to disarm could go to waste without external guarantors (March 2025).
  • Atlantic Council. Öcalan’s call for disarmament: A new hope for Kurdish peace and The impact of the PKK leader’s call to disarm.
  • Al Jazeera. PKK declares ceasefire in 40-year conflict with Turkiye (1 March 2025); Kurdish-led SDF agrees integration with Syrian government forces (30 January 2026).
  • Middle East Council on Global Affairs. How Damascus Reclaimed Syria’s Northeast, and What Integration Now Means.
  • Middle East Forum. The Syria–SDF Deal Hands Turkey a Strategic Victory.
  • Arab Center DC. The Shrinking Space for Kurdish Autonomy in Syria; Syria’s Fragile Integration: The SDF Joins the Army but Autonomy Remains Elusive.
  • FDD. Third Time Lucky? Syrian Government and Kurdish-Led SDF Announce Latest Agreement (30 January 2026).
  • Kurdistan24. Turkish Parliamentary Report on Kurds Marks ‘Official Start of Peace Process’s Second Phase’.
  • Manara Magazine. Turkey’s Peace Process in the Context of the Kurdish–Turkish Conflict (March 2026); The US-Israel-Iran War and the Reorientation of the Kurdish-Turkish Peace Process (April 2026).
  • Middle East Institute. The DEM Party and Turkey’s Kurdish issue.
  • Al-Monitor / US News. Pro-Kurdish Party Criticises Turkey’s ‘Hesitant’ Steps Toward PKK Peace (28 April 2026).
  • US News / Reuters. Erdogan Ally Wants Jailed Kurdish Militant Leader to Have Official Status (5 May 2026).
  • Kurdish Peace Institute. Responding to the PKK’s Unilateral Ceasefire; Israel-Iran War: How Will Kurdish Actors Respond?
  • Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Turkey Has Two Key Interests in the Iran Conflict.
  • Foreign Affairs. The Iran War’s Threat to Turkey.
  • Council on Foreign Relations. Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups (Global Conflict Tracker).
  • Wikipedia. Kurdistan Workers’ Party; Kurdistan Workers’ Party insurgency; SDF–Syrian transitional government clashes (2025–present); 2026 Iran war.

04 Current Crises · Turkey · PKK · Kurdish Forces · Syria · Iraq · United States · Hybrid Warfare · Islamic State

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