Sudanese Armed Forces

Profile collection window: 2026-06-23. This is the institutional actor profile for the SAF as a state military. Live battlefield narrative, frontline control, and casualty data are tracked in Sudan Civil War and should not be duplicated here.

Executive Profile (BLUF)

• The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are the national military of Sudan and the institutional core of the internationally-recognized, Port Sudan-seated government. They are a primary belligerent in the 2023– civil war against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Fact. Confidence: High. (Wikipedia “Sudanese Armed Forces,” accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary]; cross-referenced via Sudan Civil War.)
• The SAF trace institutional lineage to the Sudan Defence Force, established January 1925 by the British colonial administration after the 1924 assassination of Sir Lee Stack; Sudanization followed independence in 1956. Fact. Confidence: High. (GlobalSecurity “Sudan Army History,” accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary]; Sudanow Magazine “100 years since founding,” accessed 2026-06-23 [state-aligned].)
• Supreme command is held by Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (b. 1960), who is concurrently Commander-in-Chief of the SAF and Chairman/President of the Transitional Sovereignty Council — making him both head of the armed forces and de facto head of state. He has led Sudan since 2019 and consolidated power via the October 2021 coup. Fact. Confidence: High. (Wikipedia “Abdel Fattah al-Burhan,” accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary]; African Union, 2022-09-23 [primary]; Anadolu Agency, accessed 2026-06-23 [state-aligned, TR].)
• The SAF retain a conventional combined-arms force structure — army, the Sudanese Air Force, and a small navy — with a Soviet/Chinese-origin inventory, plus a state-owned defense-industrial conglomerate. Personnel estimates diverge widely: ~200,000 pre-war (CIA), up to ~300,000 (Al Jazeera, 2024). Fact (with estimate spread). Confidence: Medium. (CIA / Al Jazeera figures via Wikipedia “Sudanese Armed Forces,” accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary].)

Organizational Profile

• Type: National armed forces of a sovereign state; the institutional spine of the Port Sudan-based Transitional Sovereignty Council government. Fact. Confidence: High.
• Established: 1925 (as Sudan Defence Force); navy established 1962. Fact. Confidence: High. (Wikipedia; GlobalSecurity, accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary].)
• Primary base of operations: Following the RSF’s 2023 seizure of much of greater Khartoum, the SAF-aligned government relocated its seat to Port Sudan on the Red Sea, which functions as the wartime administrative and command hub. SAF recaptured central Khartoum in 2025 (see Sudan Civil War). Fact. Confidence: High. (Critical Threats / AEI “Drones Over Sudan,” accessed 2026-06-23 [advocacy]; cross-ref Sudan Civil War.)
• Leadership (current-date verified): Commander-in-Chief Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. In a 2026 command reshuffle, Burhan abolished the posts of deputy commander and assistants to the commander-in-chief, sidelining long-time deputy Gen. Shams al-Din Kabbashi (reassigned to “Construction and Strategic Planning Affairs”) — a centralization of command around Burhan personally. Fact. Confidence: Medium-High. (Sudan Tribune “Burhan abolishes top army leadership posts” / “centralizes command,” accessed 2026-06-23 [primary, Sudan beat]; Asharq al-Awsat, accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary].)
• Doctrine/orientation: Conventional state-military doctrine; in this war reliant on air power and standoff fires to offset the RSF’s mobile light-infantry advantage. Islamist-aligned mobilization networks (former regime / Muslim Brotherhood-linked elements) have been reported as fighting alongside the SAF. Assessment. Confidence: Medium. (Jewish Insider, 2025-10 [advocacy]; AEI / Critical Threats, accessed 2026-06-23 [advocacy].)

Strategic Objectives

• Stated objective 1 — Defeat the RSF and restore the state monopoly on force. The SAF frame the war as a defense of the Sudanese state against a rebellious paramilitary. Fact (stated). Confidence: High. (Sovereignty Council / Burhan statements via Anadolu, TRT, accessed 2026-06-23 [state-aligned].)
• Stated objective 2 — Preserve the SAF as the central institution of the post-war Sudanese state, including its economic and political prerogatives, against any settlement that would dilute military primacy. Assessment. Confidence: Medium. (Inferred from command centralization and political posture; Sudan Tribune, accessed 2026-06-23 [primary].)
• Inferred objective 3 — Secure great-power patronage (arms + diplomatic cover) by trading strategic access. The SAF government has dangled a Red Sea naval base and mining concessions to attract Russian, Iranian, Egyptian, and (via normalization signaling) Israeli/US backing. Assessment. Confidence: Medium-High. (Army Recognition / National Interest / DefenceWeb on the Russia jets-for-base talks; Reuters/AP via Wikipedia on the 2025 Israel envoy normalization push, accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary/advocacy].)

Capabilities & Methods

Domain	Capability Level	Key Tools / Methods	Source & Confidence
Kinetic / Conventional	Substantial (degraded)	Combined-arms army; Sudanese Air Force flying MiG-29, Su-24, Su-25, Nanchang Q-5 for low-level interdiction and precision strikes on RSF; armor and artillery	globalmilitary.net / Military Africa / Wikipedia “Sudanese Air Force,” accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary]. Confidence: High
Defense-Industrial	Limited–Substantial	Defense Industries System (DIS), formerly Military Industry Corporation — SAF-owned conglomerate; Al-Shajara & Al-Zarqā complexes; Sudan Aircraft Complex (est. 2005); license assembly/refurbishment of Chinese & Russian designs	Wikipedia “Military Industry Corporation”; OpenSanctions, accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary]. Confidence: Medium-High
Drone / Standoff	Substantial (import-dependent)	Iranian Mohajer-6 and Qods Aviation drones supplied to SAF; Egypt-operated drones against RSF; SAF seeking Su-30/Su-35 + air defense from Russia	Critical Threats/AEI; FDD, 2026-06-22; National Security News, 2024-01, accessed 2026-06-23 [advocacy/secondary]. Confidence: Medium-High
Cyber	Limited	No documented advanced offensive cyber program; reliance on conventional ISR and foreign-supplied systems	Gap. Confidence: Low
Information	Limited–Substantial	State-media apparatus and Sovereignty Council messaging; Burhan reportedly moved to centralize and sideline army social-media officers in 2026	Sudan Tribune “sidelines social media officers,” accessed 2026-06-23 [primary]. Confidence: Medium
Diplomatic	Substantial	Holds the internationally-recognized government seat; leverages Red Sea geography (naval-base offers) and Abraham Accords/normalization signaling for patronage	Army Recognition; Irish Times, 2025-12; Wikipedia, accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary]. Confidence: Medium-High

Key Relationships

• Egypt — Closest state patron. Reported to have provided aerial support, Chinese-made K-8 trainers/light attack aircraft, ammunition, training, and intelligence; views Sudanese instability and Nile-water security as a direct national-security interest; reportedly operated a border airbase for strikes on the RSF. Fact/Assessment. Confidence: Medium-High. (EUAA Sudan COI 2025; Standard Media; AEI, accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary/advocacy].)
• Iran — Wartime drone supplier (Qods Aviation / Mohajer-6); ~7 cargo flights Iran↔Sudan Dec 2023–Jul 2024; reportedly sought a Red Sea naval foothold in exchange. As of mid-2026, the SAF is reportedly scaling back Iranian purchases to court Washington. Fact/Assessment. Confidence: Medium-High. (FDD, 2026-06-22; Critical Threats; National Security News, accessed 2026-06-23 [advocacy/secondary].)
• Russian Federation — Negotiating a jets-for-base arrangement: a draft 25-year Port Sudan naval-facility deal (up to 300 personnel, four warships incl. nuclear-powered) plus mining access, against Su-30/Su-35 and air-defense supply. Russia’s ambassador announced a suspension of construction planning on 2025-11-12 citing the conflict. Fact. Confidence: Medium-High. (Army Recognition; National Interest; Irish Times, 2025-12, accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary].)
• Rapid Support Forces — Principal adversary; former partner paramilitary turned belligerent since 2023-04-15. Fact. Confidence: High. (Cross-ref Sudan Civil War.)
• UAE (no vault note) — Widely reported principal external backer of the RSF (i.e., adversary-aligned from the SAF’s perspective). Assessment. Confidence: Medium. (Sudan Civil War frontmatter; EUAA COI 2025 [secondary].)

Active Involvement

• Sudan Civil War (2023– ) — Primary belligerent; this profile is the institutional companion to that crisis note. Fact. Confidence: High.

Assessment

The SAF are a conventional state military fighting a degraded, attrition war against a more mobile paramilitary, compensating for ground disadvantages with air power and imported drones while leasing strategic access (Red Sea basing, mining) to sustain arms flows. Command has centralized sharply around Burhan personally through 2026. Threat-level calibrated medium: a regional actor with substantial-but-degraded capability in 1+ domains, internally focused rather than projecting external hostile operations against the analyst’s region of interest. Assessment. Confidence: Medium.

Gaps: independent verification of personnel strength (estimates span 200k–300k); current order of battle post-Khartoum recapture; the live status of the Russian base deal after the Nov-2025 suspension; the depth of Islamist-network integration into SAF command. Confidence: Low on each.

Sources

• Wikipedia, “Sudanese Armed Forces” / “Sudanese Air Force” / “Abdel Fattah al-Burhan” / “Military Industry Corporation” — accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary]
• GlobalSecurity, “Sudan Army History” — accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary]
• Sudanow Magazine, “100 years since founding of the Sudanese army” — accessed 2026-06-23 [state-aligned]
• African Union, Burhan as President of Transitional Sovereign Council, 2022-09-23 [primary]
• Anadolu Agency / TRT, Burhan / Sovereignty Council statements — accessed 2026-06-23 [state-aligned, TR]
• Sudan Tribune, “Burhan abolishes top army leadership posts” / “centralizes command” / “sidelines social media officers” — accessed 2026-06-23 [primary]
• Asharq al-Awsat, “Burhan Reshuffles Sudanese Army Leadership” — accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary]
• Critical Threats / AEI, “Drones Over Sudan” + Africa File 2025-05-08 — accessed 2026-06-23 [advocacy]
• FDD, “Sudan Turns Away From Iranian Weapons,” 2026-06-22 — accessed 2026-06-23 [advocacy]
• National Security News, “Iran Is Secretly Supplying Combat Drones,” 2024-01 — accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary]
• EUAA, Sudan COI 2025 (International actors) — accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary]
• Standard Media (Kenya), Egypt drone use report — accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary]
• Army Recognition / The National Interest / DefenceWeb / United24 / Irish Times (2025-12), Russia jets-for-base — accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary]
• OpenSanctions, “Defense Industries System” — accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary]
• globalmilitary.net / Military Africa, Sudanese Air Force inventory — accessed 2026-06-23 [secondary]
• Jewish Insider, SAF / Muslim Brotherhood links, 2025-10 — accessed 2026-06-23 [advocacy]

Lexicon additions proposed

Outlet	Inferred tag	Rationale
Sudan Tribune	[primary] (Sudan beat)	Long-standing independent Sudan-focused outlet; original reporting on Sudanese military/political affairs.
Sudanow Magazine	[state-aligned] (Sudan)	Sudanese government-aligned publication; treat as single-source-equivalent on SAF/state framings.
globalmilitary.net / globalfirepower.com	[secondary]	Aggregated open-source order-of-battle databases; not original investigation.
FDD (Foundation for Defense of Democracies)	[advocacy]	US hawkish foreign-policy think tank; primary on original analysis, advocacy on Iran/policy framings. Similar standing to AEI.
Critical Threats (AEI project)	[advocacy]	AEI-run conflict-tracking project; primary on original Africa File analysis, advocacy on US-policy framings.